Microfinance is arguably one of the most effective techniques for poverty alleviation in developing countries. Although traditionally supported by nongovernmental organizations and socially-oriented investors, microfinance institutions (MFIs) have increasingly demonstrated their value on a stand-alone basis, typically exhibiting low default rates combined with attractive returns and growth, encouraging greater commercial involvement. This paper addresses a related issue -whether microfinance shows low correlation with international and domestic market performance measures. If so, it could form the empirical basis for MFI access to capital markets and performance-driven investors in their search for efficient portfolios. Our empirical tests do not show any exposure of microfinance institutions to global capital markets, but significant exposure regarding domestic GDP, suggesting that microfinance investments may have useful portfolio diversification value for international investors, not for domestic investors lacking significant country risk diversification options.
Microfinance, traditionally supported by aid agencies and non-profit entities, has become an important tool in the alleviation of poverty in developing countries. In recent years, the role of non-profit lenders and investors in microfinance institutions (MFIs) has declined as broader sources of funding have been accessed, including client deposits of bank-related micro-lenders, refinancings via interbank deposits and commercial loans, and raising funds in capital markets.
Apart from the social benefit associated with an increase of available funds, the argument for commercialization of microfinance is that the risk of financial loss -comprising the likelihood of default, the loss given default (LGD), and present value of expected recoveries (ER) -tends to be low relative to the returns, and that the risk-adjusted total returns on microfinance exhibit low correlations to those of other available asset classes, thereby presenting investors with an attractive opportunity for portfolio diversification. This paper focuses on the question whether the value of financial exposure to MFIs in fact exhibits low correlations with the value of broad asset categories available to commercial investors, both locally and globally. If the finding is that the correlations are low, then it is possible to argue that microfinance investments represent a potentially useful asset allocation technique for fund managers seeking greater portfolio efficiency. Such a finding would also form the basis for improved access for MFI funding through securitization issues distributed to global institutional asset pools such as insurance companies, trusts and pension funds. Section 1 of this paper considers the institutional transformation of microfinance from donor-driven non-governmental organizations (NGOs) towards market-driven financial institutions -requiring adaptation of their sources of financing to commercial terms while at the same time avoiding mission-drift away from the social goal of poverty-alleviation. Section 2 presents an empirical analysis of the systemic risk of microfinance institutions, regressing key fundamental parameters and ratios of the leading MFIs against the S&P 500, MSCI Global and MSCI Emerging Markets indexes (as proxies for global market risk) as well as against domestic GDP (as proxy for domestic market risk). In addition to analyzing the absolute market risk associated with microfinance, we also consider the relative market risk in this section, comparing MFIs to other potential emerging market investments -equities of listed emerging market institutions (EMIs) and equities of listed emerging market commercial banks (EMCBs). Since available data do not yet permit solid empirical stress-testing, we link our results to case study-based evidence on the performance of MFIs in times of domestic financial and macroeconomic adversity. Section 3 attempts to explain the results observed on a qualitative basis and suggests how these findings may change as the microfinance industry matures. Section 4 presents our conclusions.
Evolution of Microfinance
Approximately 10,000 MFIs have evolved worldwide over some three decades -in an amalgam of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), commercial banking entities, credit unions, cooperatives and finance companies -serving some 40 million clients worldwide. Total loan portfolios of MFIs in mid-2006 amounted to about $17 billion, with the potential to grow to $250 to $300 billion in the foreseeable future [Ehrbeck, 2006] . Estimates of MFI annual growth rates range from 15% to 30%, thus suggesting a demand of somewhere between $2.5 billion and $5 billion for additional portfolio capital each year, with $300 million to $400 million in additional equity required to support such lending, an estimate that could well turn out to be conservative [Callaghan, Gonzalez, Maurice, Novak, 2007] What makes microfinance potentially compelling from a commercial perspective are low default rates, which for MFIs tend to fall between 1% and 3% 5 [Easton, 2005] , combined with potentially low systemic risk, impressive growth rates and reasonable returns. The median ROE over the nine years covered by our dataset (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) -which can be regarded as a collection of the leading 325 MFIs -was 5.8%, with a median loan portfolio growth rate of 37% annually (the corresponding figure for net operating income growth was 28.5%). In a recent study, Littlefield and Holtman [2005] find that worldwide, the top MFIs are nearly twice as profitable as the leading commercial banks in their local environments. An IFC panel study covering five banks in OECD countries and six emerging market banks found that SME portfolios generate higher ROA than total bank portfolios -four out of five banks noted higher portfolio and income growth for the SME segment than for the overall bank.
6
MFI transaction costs are much higher than in traditional commercial banking, but the high marginal productivity of capital expenditures undertaken
by microfinance borrowers appears to justify materially higher interest rates than typically apply in commercial lending. The standard approach to analyzing the risk of an asset class is to calculate the historical market beta -i.e. to regress the returns of an asset class over a certain period of time against the returns of a benchmark index.
This approach is only possible for publicly traded financial institutions capable of being marked-to-market and generating a dataset with a sufficiently large number of observations. MFIs are virtually all non-listed companies with no mark-to-market valuation, so it is not possible to obtain betas from historical securities prices.
A second approach is estimation of a fundamental beta -analyzing the types of businesses in which a firm operates, identifying publicly traded firms in those businesses, and obtaining their regression betas as a proxy. This is likewise not possible in the case of MFIs, since microfinance is an emerging asset class with no peer group of listed firms.
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Consequently, the only feasible approach in the case of microfinance institutions requires reliance on accounting earnings: Changes in earnings of a firm can be related to changes in earnings of the market over a comparable period to arrive at an estimate of the accounting beta. This approach admittedly suffers from biases due to earnings-smoothing by firms, and can be influenced by non-operating factors such as changes in depreciation or inventory 10 Section 3 of this paper reviews the available case-study evidence.
11 As we demonstrate in section 3, using emerging market commercial banks as a listed peer group is not a valid approach, since microfinance behaves very differently in terms of risk and thus cannot be regarded as the same asset class.
valuation, and by the allocation of corporate expenses at the divisional level.
Such issues can be addressed by using net operating income (NOI) instead of earnings, since NOI tends to reflect more accurately the performance of an institution over a given time period. Further, the approach suffers from the fact, that it compares backward-looking accounting data with forward-looking market data (stock prices). Several studies 12 have analyzed the relationship between accounting betas and market betas, and have generally found significant correlations. For example, one study finds significant correlations between accounting betas and market betas in the banking industry, ranging from thirty to sixty percent, depending on the market index employed [Karels and Sackley, 1993] . Such empirical evidence combined with the approach of using parameters of emerging market institutions in general as well as emerging market commercial banks as benchmarks, suggests that it is possible to derive -at least in terms of relative market risk -meaningful conclusions from this approach.
With respect to microfinance specifically, the value of the accounting beta is further potentially diluted by data constraints, discussed below. Since the general problems associated with the use of accounting betas and additional caveats regarding data constraints are of concern, we further examine changes with respect to five key financial variables:
1. Return on equity (ROE)
Profit margin (PM)
3. Change in total assets (TA%) 4. Change in gross loan portfolio (GLP%)
Loan portfolio at risk (PAR) 13
Variables 1 and 2 are used as profitability indicators, and variables 3 and 4 indicate changes in the value of assets, while variable 5 is an indicator of the 12 See, for example, Ball and Brown (1996) , Beaver, Kettler and Scholes (1970) , Gonedes (1973) , Beaver and Manegold (1975) , Kulkarni, Powers and Shanon (1991) and Karels and Sackley (1993) 13 Measured in terms of portfolio at risk > 30 days / gross loans for MFIs and impaired loans / gross loans for EMCBs loan portfolio quality. Variables 1 to 5 for financial institutions (variables 1 to 3 for non-financial institutions) are assumed to capture key changes in the fundamental value of an institution, which ultimately defines its market value. If it can be shown that some of the key variables are significantly more exposed to market movements for our benchmarks than they are for MFIs, this would indicate that the latter are generally less exposed to systemic risk. Jansson and Taborga [2000] note that three additional issues are fundamental for MFIsliquidity, capital, and efficiency and productivity. They should not, however, affect the results of the analysis. reverse causality could be a major problem associated with choosing domestic stock indexes as an independent variable. Additionally, it was possible to gather accurate stock market information for only about half of the 85 countries in our sample, which would have led to the loss of a large number of observations. Finally, GDP -being backward-looking -does not have the same problem as the forward-looking indexes we used in our global analysis.
We nevertheless tested the relationship with the domestic stock index for all three types of institutions and found significant correlations only for the top 325 emerging market institutions (Appendix 6).
Dataset
Our dataset comprises annual data covering the period from 1998 to 2006. 
Methodology
We use a fixed-effects regression model, which controls for differences in the levels of variables associated with individual institutions -a standard approach when dealing with panel data. As in any OLS regression model, the key assumption is that the impact of the independent variable is the same for a in parentheses following the regression coefficient, and significant results are marked in bold ("significance" is defined at the 95% level of confidence and "high significance" at the 99% level of confidence). Highly significant differences between MFIs and EMIs / EMCBs are evident regarding asset sensitivity against all three global performance measures. A 10% drop in the S&P 500 for example, is expected to lead to no impact on MFIs in terms of the asset measure, whereas EMIs and EMCBs are expected to lose approx. 4%-5% of their asset value. Furthermore, both profitability and loan portfolio quality of MFIs seems to be less sensitive to global market movements than in the case of EMCBs, as indicated by consistent highly significant differences.
Regression analysis of Microfinance with Global Capital Markets

Regression analysis of Microfinance with the Domestic Economy
Domestically, changes in net operating income of MFIs show no relationship with GDP movements. EMIs and EMCBs on the other hand display highly significant correlation. Nevertheless, we did not find significant differences for the three sets of firms regarding sensitivity of NOI.
The fundamental variables associated with MFIs show highly significant correlation for all five parameters tested. The signs of the regression coefficients are as expected, showing cyclical behavior. Profit margins seem to be the most exposed, with an R 2 value of almost 5.5%, followed by portfolio at risk with an R 2 value of almost 4%.
EMIs and EMCBs also exhibit highly significant correlation for all fundamental variables tested. Market risk seems to be generally higher for
EMIs and EMCBs, with R 2 values that are -apart from profit marginconsistently higher for these types of institutions. This can either stem from a lower quality of MFI information in the dataset or from fundamental differences -discussed at the end of this section. Still, EMIs and EMCBs show significantly less sensitivity than MFIs regarding profit margin: A 5% drop in GDP is associated with an approximately 4-5% greater drop in profit margin for MFIs than for EMIs / EMCBs. MFIs once again display significantly lower sensitivity regarding portfolio at risk -a 5% decline in GDP is expected to increase portfolio at risk by approx. 0.75% more for EMCBs than for MFIs.
Stress-testing the results
Since current data do not permit rigorous statistical stress-testing of the results, we refer to existing case-study based research on the resilience of MFIs under conditions of severe macroeconomic distress. In an overview of the performance of MFIs during economic and financial crises in emerging markets, Gonzalez and Rosenberg [2006] are not immune to macroeconomic shocks -they tend to be significantly less effected than commercial banks. Furthermore, MFIs seem to recover faster from times of economic distress than do commercial banks. The correlation with major adverse market movements seems to differ among countries and types of microfinance institutions.
Why Microfinance May Be Different
The empirical evidence presented in this study suggests that MFIs are to a significant extent detached from international capital markets, which significantly and increasingly affect the performance of emerging market institutions [Saunders and Walter, 2002] . In this section we consider possible sources of these differences in risk exposure between MFIs and EMIs / EMCBs and the extent to which MFIs will be able to sustain this advantage as the microfinance industry matures. Arguable, differences in risk exposure between
MFIs and EMIs are mainly due to variation regarding ownership and governance structure as well as international exposure of clients. Regarding
EMCBs it can be argued that additionally differences regarding operational and financial leverage as well as product and lending methodologies could have an impact.
Ownership and Governance
All EMIs and EMCBs included into the study are publicly traded companies, where shareholders mainly consist of domestic and international portfolio investors. The lack of a dominant long-term investor base in most emerging markets is often associated with substantial stock market volatility in these countries, with investors largely driven by technical trading strategies. for the local economy [Fonseca, 2004] .
If MFIs increasingly become commercial enterprises which access domestic and international financial markets, the stability advantage in terms of ownership structures is likely to deteriorate. With respect to the 1997-98 Asia financial crisis, for example, McGuire and Conroy [1998] find that microfinance appears to have suffered most where it was linked into the formal financial system and caught up in local financial crises.
Client Characteristics
MFIs target the "unbankable" -domestic customers with very low income and virtually no collateral. Most microfinance customers represent "entrepreneurs", often one of the prerequisites of obtaining microfinance credit.
This restriction, combined with clients' awareness of the high productivity of early-stage capital expenditures, explains a significantly higher investment ratio 21 The KMV model of default risk considers that the equity of a firm essentially represents a call option with an exercise price that is equal to the book value of the firm's debt. The model calculates the probability of default based on the distance between the firm's value and its debt. A significant decline in the value of a company is associated with an increase of the risk of bankruptcy. See http://www.moodyskmv.com/. 22 See also Franks [2000] .
for MFI customers. Investing instead of consuming can reduce exposure to market risk.
In addition to showing more resilience and a higher capacity to adapt [Fonseca, 2004] micro-entrepreneurs may be less integrated into the formal sector of the economy. Whereas EMI / EMCB customers consist of international corporations and individuals exposed to international market movements or domestic clients well integrated into the market and possibly import-dependent, micro-entrepreneurs may mainly sell domestically-produced goods and services to low-income domestic clients who are to a certain degree detached from the formal domestic market and even more so from the international market. Moreover, the tendency for customers to move "downmarket" to cheaper, domestically produced goods during times of economic stress may have a countercyclical effect on micro-entrepreneurs who supply them. Micro-borrowers may also value their access to credit more highly than ordinary commercial bank customers, since it may represent their only opportunity to borrow, and therefore they make greater personal sacrifices to sustain it [Patten, Rosengard and Johnston, 2001 ]. As Robinson [2001] points out, fewer alternative sources of financing increase repayment discipline, and thus may support the resilience of MFIs to financial crises.
Although empirical and theoretical evidence generally points out that MFI client characteristics are favorable, idiosyncrasies are not necessarily permanent, and mission-drift away from the poorest -a strategy that may appear attractive in terms of increasing returns -potentially has a negative impact in terms of MFI exposure to systemic risk. Focusing on Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and South Asia during the 1997-98 Asia crisis, McGuire and Conroy [1998] find that countries with the greatest concentrations of poverty were materially less affected by the regional financial shock. They also find that MFIs focusing solely on the poor appear to have withstood the crisis better than lenders not specifically targeting the poor. Finally, an InterAmerican Development Bank study on Bolivia [Rodriguez, 2002] finds that institutions serving principally or exclusively low-income women showed a higher degree of sustainability in times of crisis. Such evidence suggests that
MFIs which continue to focus on the poor entrepreneurs and maintain a deep understanding of, and close ties to, their customers may be able to preserve their resistance to macroeconomic crises.
Product Characteristics
The average loan of a commercial bank is much larger in size, bears a lower interest rate, and has a longer maturity than the average MFI loan. The first two characteristics should not have a major impact on systemic risk -i.e., the greater granularity of MFIs portfolios decrease only their firm-specific risk.
Loan maturity, on the other hand, influences the exposure to market risk. Retail banks are in general adversely affected by increases in interest rates, since their borrowing rates tend to be highly flexible (often floating), whereas their lending rates tend to be "sticky". A longer average maturity of outstanding loans increases this inflexibility and reduces their ability to adjust lending terms or to temporarily reduce lending activity in case of unfavorable movements in interest rates.
Differences in product characteristics suggest that MFI mission-drift away from services to the poor would come at the expense of a higher exposure to systemic risk as against MFIs that continue to focus on small loans with short average maturities.
Lending Techniques
Microfinance lending differs from traditional commercial banking mainly in the lack of collateral. Since loan covenants such as pledges of collateral reduce exposure to credit risk, commercial banks seem to have an advantage in terms of portfolio quality. In a theoretical paper, Bond and Rai [2006] argue, that for MFI customers the prospect of subsidized future loans is a primary source of current debt service discipline and accounts for low default rates. The expected withdrawal of subsidized future lending as a result of current defaults by fellow micro-borrowers (due for example to natural disasters or other local shocks) will eliminate that discipline and the resulting contagion will endanger the viability of the MFI. The authors suggest that larger MFI reserves and insurance arrangements to underwrite their continued viability will help constrain contagion.
However, there are several "soft factors", which can turn out to be more important than collateral, especially in countries with unstable or inefficient legal systems. The very short periods between installments (usually weekly or bi- 
Differences in Operating Leverage
Ceteris paribus, higher operating leverage results in greater earnings variability. Although reliable data on the relevant variables is unavailable for MFIs, our dataset indicates that commercial banks may have a higher operating leverage, since they tend to be more dependent on fee-based services such as investment management, mortgage origination, transactionbanking and credit card business. 25 Apart from being more volatile [DeYoung and Roland, 1999] , the input mix required to supply such financial services may generate higher fixed costs than those needed to provide traditional credit products. MFIs that diversify their activities may indeed reduce firm-specific risk, but adding business lines with higher fixed-costs will tend to increase their operating leverage and exposure to systemic risk.
Differences in Financial Leverage
Financial leverage has the same effect as operating leverage, since interest rate payments are part of the fixed obligations of a company. Thus, increased financial leverage tends to raise earnings volatility. MFIs in our dataset have an average debt-equity ratio of 2.6, while that for commercial banks averages 7. of an increase in financial leverage -in terms of moving towards an optimum capital structure -and the resulting (potentially) higher growth and profitability comes at the expense of an increase in systemic risk.
Conclusions
This paper examines systemic risk associated with microfinance. With the exception of profit margin against the MSCI World Index, MFIs in our study display no statistically significant relationship with global market movements.
Regarding exposure to domestic GDP, MFIs display -apart from net operating 
